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CASENOTES
Punitive Damages and the Use of Modern Common Law in Construing Section 1983:
Smith v. Wade' — In 1871, Congress enacted 42 U.S.C. section 19832 to grant the federal
courts control over states that did not enforce the rights of their citizens, particularly the
newly freed slaves.' The statute provided citizens with a right of action in federal court
against local government officials who, while representing the state, either failed to
enforce the law or treated citizens unfairly, and thereby violated their constitutional
rights.4 Prior to the Supreme Court's 1961 decision in Monroe v. Pape,' section 1983 was
not available to plaintiffs who could seek a remedy in state court. Monroe changed this
interpretation of section 1983 by holding that the federal remedy was supplementary to
the state remedy.' As a result, since 1961, a tremendous number of persons have filed suit
under section 1983 claiming injury as a consequence of conduct by state and local
officials.' The increase in section 1983 cases has forced the Supreme Court to reconsider
the purposes and policies behind section 1983 and to define the nature and scope of the
statute. In reconsidering these issues, the Court has placed significant emphasis on
common law tort principles, particularly in reference to the issue of damages.' The
Supreme Court considered whether the common law standard governing an award of
punitive damages under tort law was applicable to an award of punitive damages under
section 1983 in the recent case of Smith v. Wade."
In 1976, the plaintiff in Smith v. Wade, Daniel Wade, was an inmate at a Missouri
reformatory for youthful first offenders.' After other prisoners had repeatedly assaulted
him, the plaintiff admitted himself to the reformatory's protective custody unit." Subse-
quently, prison officials transferred Wade to punitive segregation for disciplinary viola-
tions, and then to administrative segregation.' 2 Although Wade was initially placed in a
cell with one other inmate, the defendant, William Smith, a guard at the prison, placed a
461 U.S. 30 (1983).
2 Section 1983, in part, provides that:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall he liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
3 See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172-74 (1961) (citing Com:. Gi.otni, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 244
(1871)).
• Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. at 180.
• 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
" Id. at 183.
See McClellan and Northcross, Remedies and Damages for Violation of Constitutional Rights, 18
DUQ. L. REV, 409, 412 (1980) [hereinafter cited as McClellan and Northcrossj; Nahmod, Constitu-
tional Accountability in Section 1983 Litigation, 68 IOWA L. Rev. 1, 2 (1982); Newman, Suing the
Lawbreakers: Proposals to Strengthen the Section 1983 Damage Remedy for Law Enforcers' Misconduct, 87
YALE L.J. 447, 451-52 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Newman].
" See Nahmod, Section 1983 and the "Background of Tort Liability," 50 IND. L.J. 5, 12 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Nahmod].
• 461 U.S. 30 (1983).
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third inmate in the cell when he came on duty later that day." The defendant chose the
plaintiff's cell despite the third inmate's known aggressive behavior, the plaintiff's recent
susceptibility to assault, and the availability of other cells in the same dormitory with only
one inmate!' Shortly after the defendant placed the third inmate in the cell, the plain-
tiff's two cellmates beat and sexually assaulted him."
The plaintiff filed suit in federal district court under section 1983 against the
defendant alleging that the defendant had violated his eighth amendment rights!'
Claiming that the defendant knew or should have known of the likelihood of assault, the
plaintiff sought both compensatory and punitive damages."' At trial, the district judge
instructed the jury that to establish a violation of his rights under the eighth amendment,
Wade had to show "physical abuse of such base, inhumane and barbaric proportions as to
shock the sensibilities.' In addition, the judge stated that due to the defendant's qual-
ified immunity as a state prison guard, the jury could only award compensatory damages
if the defendant's behavior constituted gross negligence." The judge further instructed
the jury that it could award punitive damages if the defendant's conduct were shown to be
in "reckless or callous disregard of, or indifference to, the rights or safety of others. . . ." 21
The jury found the defendant liable and awarded the plaintiff $25,000 in compensatory
damages and $5,000 in punitive damages. 22
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district judge's instructions
regarding punitive damages,' citing Carey v. Piphus ;44 In Carey, the Supreme Court
suggested that plaintiffs were required to demonstrate malicious intent in order to
recover punitive damages." The Eighth Circuit in Wade interpreted malicious intent to
include both actual intent and conduct, so egregious and reckless as to imply the requisite
intent.' Consequently, the court fOund the district judge's instruction, with its reckless-




' 6 Id. Also named in the suit were four other correctional officers, including the Director of the
Missouri Board of Corrections. The judge granted directed verdicts for two defendants and the jury
acquitted the two others. Wade v. Haynes, 663 F.2d 778, 780 (8th Cir. 1981).
' 7 461 U.S. at 32. The eighth amendment states: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted." U.S CoNs•r. amend. VIII.
Wade, 461 U.S. at 32-33.
19
 Id. at 32.
Id, at 32-33.
211
 Id. at 33.
22 Id.
" Wade v. Haynes, 663 F.2d 778 (8th Cir. 1981).
24 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
25 Id. at 257 n.11.
Wade v. Haynes, 663 F.2d 778, 786 (8th Cir. 1981).
" Id. One judge dissented on the issue of punitive damages. Id. His dissent stated that an award
of punitive damages should not be granted absent a showing of actual malice, and that a distinction
should be recognized between compensatory and punitive awards against an official with qualified
immunity. Id. at 787. For a discussion of the distinction between actual and implied malice, see D.
DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW or REMEDIES § 3.9 at 207-08 (1973) (hereinafter cited as Doess];
Ellis, Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. I, 33 - 37 (1982)
[hereinafter cited as Ellis]; Note, Punitive Damages in Section 1983 Actions: The Eighth Circuit's Require-
ment of Malicious Intent, 16 CREIGHTON L. REV. 898, 898 n.6 (1983).
In addition to the award of punitive damages, the Court of Appeals affirmed the sufficiency of
the evidence, the instruction regarding cruel and unusual punishment, the ruling of the district
September 1984)	 CASENOTES	 1003
Smith then filed a petition for certiorari with the United States Supreme Court,
which the Court granted." In a five-to-four decision, the Court affirmed the decision of
the Eighth Circuit." The Court held that a jury could award punitive damages in a section
1983 action where the defendant acted either with evil motive or intent, or in reckless or
callous indifference, in violating the plaintiff's federally protected rights. 30 The Court
adopted a recklessness standard even though the defendant's qualified immunity in Wade
resulted in identical standards for both compensatory and punitive damages.' In its
holding, the Court used a two-step approach. First, the Court examined the common law
and determined that the tort standard for awarding punitive damages, both in 1871 and
today, was reckless indifference or intent.' Second, the Court considered the policy
behind section 1983 and concluded that application of the tort standard properly served
those policy considerations."
The Wade holding not only represents the first instance in which the Supreme Court
has specifically validated an award of punitive damages under section 1983, but it also
establishes the standard for such an award." By adopting a recklessness standard, as
opposed to a stricter intent standard, the Court has increased the chances for plaintiffs to
recover punitive damages and rendered section 1983 a potentially more effective device
for plaintiffs in challenging constitutional violations." The real significance of the Wade
decision, however, might lie not in its particular holding, but in the approach to the issue
employed by the Court.' As it had in past decisions, the Wade Court relied on a two-step
analytical approach to section 1983.37 Under the first prong, however, in addition to
considering the common law as of 1871, the Court also relied on modern common law. 38
This reliance on modern common law represents a departure from the Court's traditional
two-pronged analysis. 3'
This casenote will begin by discussing the background and development of recoveries
under section 1983 to establish the context in which the Court decided Smith v. Wade."
The discussion will focus on previous Supreme Court cases involving government im-
munities and plaintiffs' damages in which the Court has adopted a two-step analytical
approach to section 1983 claims,' Next, the casenote will present the Wade decision,
describing the approach and the reasoning employed by the majority and the two
dissenting opinions.42 The Supreme Court's reasoning will then be analyzed by discussing
the likely ramifications of Wade. First, the decision's effect on future plaintiffs and
judge on both the cross examination and the closing argument of the plaintiff's counsel, the
exclusion of documentary evidence and the use of expert testimony, Wade v. Haynes, 663 F.2d 778,
780, 786 (8th Cir. 1981).
2' 456 U.S. 924 (1982).
29 Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983).
" Id.
Id.
32 Id. at 38-48.
m Id. at 48-51, 55.
34 Id. at 56.
" See infra notes 279 - 90 and accompanying text.
a See infra notes 302-35 and accompanying text.
" 461 U.S. at 34.
3' Id.
39 See infra notes 302 -35 and accompanying text.
" 461 U.S. 30 (1983).
4' See infra notes 52 - 130 and accompanying text.
42 See infra notes 173-266 and accompanying text.
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defendants in section 1983 suits will be considered. 43 The presentation highlights the
advantages to plaintiffs resulting from a recklessness standard for section 1983 punitive
damages, and discusses this standard's broader impact on damages generally under
section 1983. It will be submitted that the Court properly chose the recklessness standard.
Second, the casenote will discuss the majority's determination that modern tort law should
be considered in determining whether, and under what standard, courts may award
punitive damages under section 1983." It will be submitted that the Wade Court properly
considered modern tort law. The discussion shows, however, that this consideration of
modern tort law could have a significant impact on future section 1983 cases decided
under the established two-step approach, particularly in areas where the common law has
changed between 1871 and the present.
1. THE BACKGROUND OF SMITH V. WADE
In ruling on the availability of punitive damages tinder section 1983, the Wade Court
placed significant weight on the status of punitive damages under the common law of
torts." As this casenote will demonstrate, the Wade Court's reliance on the common law
was consistent with the Court's approach to prior cases under section 1983." In earlier
section 1983 cases, the Court had first looked to the statute's legislative history in an
attempt to discern congressional intent.' Where the legislative history did not address the
issue in question, the Court had then turned to the common law of torts for guidance.'
This section of the casenote will examine two areas of section 1983, government im-
munities and' damages, where the Court has looked to the common law of torts.'9
Through these cases, the section will set forth the Court's approach to interpreting section
1983. The section will then examine previous references to the availability of punitive
damages by the Supreme Court. 5° Finally, this section will discuss how the lower courts
have responded to these references and the standards under which they have awarded
punitive damages in suits filed under section 1983. 51
A. Looking to Common Law: A Two-Step Approach
1. The Immunity Cases
The Supreme Court's reliance on the common law of torts in addressing issues
arising under section 1983 is exemplified by the Court's decisions in government immu-
as See infra notes 279- 301 and accompanying text.
44 See infra notes 302-35 and accompanying text.
45 Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 38-48 (1983). See infra notes 181 -92,223 - 36 and accompanying
text.
" See, e.g., City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 258-59 (1981); Carey v. Piphus,
435 U.S. 247, 255 & n.9 (1978); lmbler v. Paclii man, 424 U.S. 409, 421 (1976); Tenney v. Bran-
dhove, 341 U.S. 367, 376 (1951). For a discussion of these cases, see infra notes 60-130 and
accompanying text.
See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 255 & n.9 (1978); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967).
For an extensive discussion of section 1983's legislative history, see Mond! v. New York City Dept of
Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 664-89 (1978).
as See cases cited supra note 46.
as See infra notes 52-130 and accompanying text.
so See infra notes 131-59 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 160- 72 and accompanying text.
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pity cases. 52 The immunity cases involved the issue of whether particular classes of
individuals are protected from section 1983 liability by either qualified or absolute
immunity." As the term indicates, a defendant granted absolute immunity is completely
shielded from liability while acting within the scope of his or her official duties." If the
defendant is acting within the scope of his employment, absolute immunity serves to
dismiss the suit even if his misconduct is malicious and corrupt." A defendant with
qualified immunity, on the other hand, is protected from liability only when carrying out
his or her duties in good faith." Qualified immunity, so understood, often shields a
defendant from liability for negligent conduct, but offers no protection for reckless or
intentional conduct." Neither the language of section 1983 nor the statute's legislative
history indicates which immunities, if any, apply to defendants in section 1983 suits."
Consequently the Court has looked to the common law of torts for guidance and consid-
ered whether a particular defendant would have been immune from liability had the suit
been brought under tort law."
The first evidence of the Court's reliance on the common law in immunity cases was
shown in 1961, in Tenney v. Brandhove."" In Tenney, the plaintiff filed suit under section
1983"' against members of the California • Senate Fact-Finding Committee on Un-
American Activities.' The plaintiff claimed that, members of the committee had violated
his first and fourteenth amendment rights by bringing contempt proceedings against him
See Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325 (1983) (witnesses held to be absolutely immune under
section 1983); City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271 (1981) (municipality
absolutely immune from punitive damages); Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 561 (1978)
(prison officials granted qualified immunity); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 424, 431 (1976)
(state prosecutor granted absolute immunity); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975) (school
official granted qualified immunity); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554-55 n.9 (1967) (judges —
absolute immunity); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 376, 379 (1951) (legislators — absolute
immunity). For a summary of the immunity cases decided before 1976, see Kattan, Knocking on Wood:
Some Thoughts on the Immunities of State Officials to Civil Rights Damage Actions, 30 VAND: L. RE:v. 941,
956-78 (1977).
" See cases cited supra note 52. The theory behind the granting of immunities is stated in
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974):
Public officials, whether governors, mayors, or police, legislators or judges, who fail to
make decisions when they are needed or who do not act to implement decisions when
they are made do not fully and faithfully perfin-in the duties of their offices. implicit in
the idea that officials have some immunity — absolute or qualified — for their acts, is a
recognition that they may err. The concept of immunity assumes this and goes on to
assume that it is better to risk some error and possible injury from such error than not
to decide or act at all.
Id. at 241-42.
" Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 419 11.13 (1976).
" Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967).
" Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247-48 (1974).
" Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975). The defendant in Smith v. Wade, a state prison
official, had qualified immunity. 461 U.S. at 32-33. At trial, the court instructed the jury that it could
only find the defendant liable if his actions constituted "gross negligence" or "egregious" conduct. Id.
at 33. The parties in Wade agreed that this standard was substantially the same as a recklessness or
callous indifference standard. Id. at 51.
" See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967).
" See, e.g., Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 330-34 (1983); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409,
421-24 (1976).
" 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
" At the time the suit was ,filed, the statute was codified at 8 U.S.C. § 43.
" Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 369 (1951).
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for his refusal to testify at an investigatory hearing." Further, the plaintiff alleged that the
proceedings were designed solely tb intimidate, and thus to silence him." 4 Holding that
the legislators were absolutely immune from liability," the Tenney Court examined the
history of legislative immunity dating back to the sixteenth century.5" The Court framed
the issue before it as a question of whether Congress, through the language of section
1983, had meant to overturn the firmly entrenched tradition of legislative immunity."'
Reasoning that Congress would not have chosen such general language if it had intended
to make such a significant change, the Court concluded that the immunity available to
legislators in suits filed under a tort theory was thus similarly available to legislators in
suits filed tinder section 1983.""
In relying on the common law of torts, the Tenney Court adopted an approach that
would be used consistently in the Court's consideration of subsequent immunity cases
brought tinder section 1983.65 This approach was clearly articulated in ',abler v.
Peichtman,' where the Court turned to common law in determining whether a prosecut-
ing attorney was immune in an action under section 1983." In Imbler, an individual who
had been convicted of murder obtained his release from prison due to the prosecuting
attorney's knowing use of false testimony and intentional suppression of material evi-
dence at trial. 72 The released prisoner Filed a section 1983 suit against the prosecuting
attorney, seeking damages for his loss of liberty." The Court held that a prosecuting
attorney was absolutely immune from damages under section 1983 when acting within
the scope of his duties." In its decision, the Court undertook a two-step process in
analyzing the immunities to section 1983." First, the Court followed the Tenney decision'
by examining the immunity offered in a common law tort action." The Imbler Court
found that the absolute immunity of a prosecutor was firmly established under the
common law.'" Second, the Court analyzed whether the purpose and policy behind
section 1983 dictated a modification of the common law ride." In Imbler, the Court found
that the rationale for the immunity offered prosecutors under the common law was
equally applicable to prosecutors in suits under section 1983." According to the Court, it
was equally important in suits under section 1983 as it was in suits under common law that
"3
 Id. at 370- 71.
" Id. at 371.
• Id. at 372-76.
"" Id. at 372-73.
" Id. at 376.
• Id.
33
 See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
" 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
" Id. at 421-24.
72 Id. at 412-15. After Imbler's conviction, the prosecuting attorney notified the Governor that
new evidence had turned up after the trial which added support to the defendant's alibi. Id. at 412.
Additionally, new evidence, according to the prosecutor, suggested that the state's principal witness
was not as trustworthy as originally believed. Id.
73 Id. at 415-16.
" Id, at 424, 431.
7 ' Id. at 421-24.
" 341 U.S. 367, 372-73 (1951).
" Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. at 421 - 24.
" Id. at 424.
" Id. at 424-29.
86 Id. at 424.
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the performance of a prosecutor not be undermined by the threat of an action for
malicious prosecution."
The two-step approach articulated by the Supreme Court in Intbler, a determination
of the common law rule and an examination of policy, was used by the Court in many
subsequent immunity cases." In these cases, the absence of any clear congressional intent
for section 1983 immunities necessitated the Court's reliance on the common law." In
cases where the common law immunity existed in 1871, the year in which section 1983 was
enacted, the Court could assume that unless stated otherwise, Congress "intended" to
adopt common law principles in section 1983." The Court, in effect, justified its reliance
on common law by reasoning that 1871 common law was the equivalent to a determina-
tion of congressional intent. Where the particular immunity did not exist in 1871, but was
adopted after section 1983's enactment, it has been more difficult fOr the Court to justify
its use of common law as evidence of congressional intent.' Despite this difficulty, the
Court has looked to post-1871 common law for guidance in determining plaintiffs' rights
under section 1983 and proceeded to use the two-step analytical approach."
2. The Damages Cases
In determining the availability of damages under section 1983, the Supreme Court,
as it has in the immunity cases, has placed significant weight on the common law of torts."
The first indication of the Court's reliance on the common law occurred in 1961, in the
landmark decision of Monroe v. Pape." In Monroe, the Court held that potential plaintiffs
did not have to exhaust state court remedies before filing suit under section 1983."
Additionally, the Monroe Court's reasoning in that case influenced the Court's approach to
other issues arising under section 1983, particularly the availability of damages." The
Court determined that thirteen Chicago police officers acted "under color of state law -9 '
N1 Id.
" See supra note 52.
" See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967).
" City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 258 (1981).
n See, e.g., Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976) (immunity for prosecutors first recognized
in 1896 in Griffith v. Slinkard, 146 Ind. 117, 44 N.E. 1001 (1896)); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547
(1967) (immunity for judges first recognized in Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1872)).
" The Court has recognized two immunities under section 1983 which did not exist under the
common law of torts in 1871, the year of section 1983's enactment. Imbler v. Pachunan, 424 U.S. 409
(1976) (prosecutors); Pierson v, Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967) (judges). Both of these decisions cite
modern tort law. In neither case, however, was the recognition of post-1871 common law an issue.
The Court merely looked to tort law as it had in other section 1983 immunity cases and followed with
an analysis of the purpose and policy behind section 1983. See Imbler, 424 U.S. at 420-24; Pierson, 386
U.S. at 554. For a more detailed examination of the Court's reliance on modern tort law, see infra
notes 302-35 and accompanying text.
" See, e.g., City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 259-63 (1981); Carey v. Piphus,
435 U.S. 247, 255 & n.9 (1978).
" 365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruled in part, Mona v. N.Y. City Dep't of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658
(1978). Monroe held in part that a municipality was not a "person" under section 1983, and thus was
absolutely immune from liability. 365 U.S. at 191. In Menial, the Court overruled this particular
holding, ruling that a municipality was not shielded from liability where the execution of official
government policy resulted in the infliction of an injury. 436 U.S. at 663.
"a
	
U.S. at 183. See supra notes 2-8 and accompanying text.
uo See infra notes 97 - 130 and accompanying text.
91 365 U.S. 167, 184. The Monroe Court, quoting from United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299,
326 (1940), defined acting "under color of state law" as the "[m]isuse of power, possessed by virtue of
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when, without benefit. of a search or arrest warrant, the officers ransacked petitioner's
home in the early morning and later detained petitioner at the police station for ten
hours.' In interpreting the phrase "under color of state law," Justice Douglas, writing for
the Court, commented that section 1983 "should be read against the background of tort
liability that makes a man responsible for the natural consequences of his actions..." As a
result of the analogy drawn by Justice Douglas, a doctrinal nexus developed between
common law tort liability and liability under section 1983." Courts began to approach
actions under section 1983 in much the same fashion as they had approached suits under
tort law." The Court extended the nexus to section 1983 damage cases, and consequently,
the Court's analysis of section 1983 damages became identical to the two-step analysis
employed in the immunity cases. Under this analysis, the Court first determines how the
particular issue was handled under tort law, and second, ascertains whether the policy
and purpose behind section 1983 necessitated a change from the common law standard."'
The reliance on the two-step analysis was evident in the Supreme Court's decision in
Carey v. Piphus." In Carey, the plaintiffs had been suspended from public school without
the benefit of a hearing." The students brought suit under section 1983, seeking damages
for the denial of their right to procedural due process." The Court held that plaintiffs
suing under section 1983 were only entitled to compensation for their actual injuries.''"
state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state
law...." 365 U.S. ,at 184.
92
 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 169 (1961).
" Id. at 187.
" See generally Nahmod, supra note 8.
" See Nahmod,supra note 8. Professor Nahmod explores the influence of tort principles on the
Court's handling of section 1983 cases. In particular, he focuses on the issues of duty, proximate
cause, negligence, strict liability, and defenses. Id. at 13-32. For example. Professor Nahmod exam-
ines bow the lower courts have handled the issue of whether a section 1983 action can be based on
mere negligence, or whether gross negligence or intentional conduct is required. Id. at 16-22.
For cases only requiring ordinary negligence, see Carter v. Estelle, 519 F.2d 1136, 1136-37 (5th
Cir. 1975); Fitzke v. Shappell, 468 F.2d 1072, 1077 n.7 (6th Cir. 1972); McCray v. Maryland, 456
F.2d I, 5 (4th Cir. 1972). For cases requiring more than ordinary negligence, see Floitt v. Vitek, 497
F.2d 598, 602 (1st Cir. 1974).
Professor Nahmod suggests, however, that Justice Douglas did not intend to create such a strong
comparison between section 1983 and tort law. Nahmod, supra note 8. at 9. According to Nahmod,
Justice Douglas was merely commenting that the common law definition of intent — liability where.
the conduct itself is intended, even absent the intent to produce the eventual result — should apply to
section 1983. Id. at 6. Whatever justice Douglas' intentions may have been, however, tort law has
become a guiding principle for section 1983.
" Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
cF7
98 Id. at 248. The cases of two students were consolidated for trial. In one case, a sixth grade
student had been suspended for wearing an earring. In the other, a ninth grade student had been
suspended for smoking what the principal believed to be marijuana. Id. at 248
- 51.
"" Id. at 248.
Id. at 257. The Court's holding in Carey was narrowly drawn and controls only in cases
involving violations of procedural due process. Id. at 264-65. Lower courts have, however, required
proof of actual injury in cases involving other constitutional violations. See infra notes 280-90 and
accompanying text. See, e.g., Morrow v. Igleburger, 584 F.2d 767, 769 (6th Cir. 1978) (illegal
incarceration), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1118 (1978); Davis v. Village Park II Realty Co., 578 F.2d 461,
463 (2d Cir. 1978) (first amendment); Reyes v. Edmunds, 472 F. Supp. 1218, 1230 (D. Minn. 1979)
(fourth amendment); O'Brien v. Leidinger, 452 F. Stipp. 720, 727 (E.D. Va. 1978) (first amendment
and equal protection). But see Herrera v. Valentine, 653 F.2d 1220, 1228 -29 (8th Cir. 1981) ("The
holding in Carey was specifically limited to its facts."); Halperin v. Kissinger, 606 F.2d 1192, 1207
n.I 00 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (suggesting that Carey does not apply to fourth amendment violations).
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Despite finding a due process violation, the Court held that where a due process depriva-
non is justified, plaintiffs, to recover, must show that the due process violation itself
caused mental and emotional stress. 1 °' In Carey, the plaintiffs had failed to prove a
compensable injury.'" The Court based this holding on an acceptance of section 1983 as
"a species of tort liability,'" where rights existed not "in a vacuum,'" but. rather in the
form of compensation for injuries incurred.'" Raving justified its decision to apply tort
principles to a suit under section 1983, the Court looked to the common law in 1871, the
year in which section 1983 was enacted. 10" The Court noted that in 1871 it was well-settled
that tort law only enabled plaintiffs to recover for actual damages.'" According to the
Court, Congress, which was comprised of a substantial number of lawyers, must have
been aware of this compensatory theory of damages when it enacted section 1983.'" The
Carey Court thus approached the issue of damages under section 1983 by assuming that
Congress adopted this relatively straightforward concept into the statute.'"
The Court then undertook the second step in the two-step analysis and considered
whether the policy and purpose behind section 1983 required a change from the common
law standard of compensation. As part of its policy examination, the Court considered
whether tort theories of compensation constituted a viable approach to cases under
section 1983. 110 Damages under the common law of torts, the Court acknowledged, would
not always prove adequate for satisfying constitutional violations."' The Court claimed
that in such cases, however, courts could adequately, .adopt the rules of common law
damages to provide sufficient. compensation for constitutional deprivations, if those
deprivations had caused compensable injury." 2 Consequently, the Carey Court deter-
mined that a violation of procedural due process, in and of itself', did not entitle plaintiffs
to the right to recover damages.'" In its decision, therefore, the Court extended the
two-step analysis of section 1983 cases to the issue of damages and also solidified "the
background of tort liability - concept articulated in Monroe.'"
Two years after the Carey decision, the Court again relied on the common law of torts
in City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc.,'" holding that punitive damages were not available
in a section 1983 suit against a municipality.'" While Fact Concerts could be characterized
1" 435 U.S. at 263.
,11-1. at 251-52.
105 Id. at 253 (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 417 (1 976)).
1 " 435 U.S. at 254.
1 ' Id. The lower federal courts had already applied principles of common law tort damages to
constitutional violations. See Zarcone v. Perry, 572 F.2d 52, 55 (2d Cir. 1978); Joseph v. Rowlen. 425
F.2d 1010, 1013 (7th Cir. 1970). For articles criticizing section 1983's reliance on the common law,
see Note, Damage Awards for Constitutional Torts: A Reconsideration After Carey v. Piphus, 93 HARV. L.
Rev. 966, 967 (1979); Note, Section 1983: An Analysis of Damage Awards , 58 Nh.R. L. REV. 580, 580-81
(1979).
Carey, 435 U.S. at 255.
Id
"5 Id.
1 °9 Id. at 256-57.
"" Id. at 257-64.
1 " Id. at 258. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 196 & n.5 (1961) (Harlan, J., concurring).
112 Carey, 435 U.S. at 258-59.
'" Id at 264. Justice Powell, writing for the Court, did refer directly to the issue of punitive
damages. For this portion of the Carey opinion, see infra notes 144-51 and accompanying text.
1 " See supra notes 88-96 and accompanying text.
ns 453 U.S. 247 (1981).
1 ' Id. at 271.
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as an immunity case, the decision's importance to the general issue of punitive damages
under section 1983 is significant. In Fact Concerts, the plaintiff filed suit under section
1983 claiming that the City of Newport had violated its rights to free expression and due
process by withdrawing a license it had previously issued for a concert."' While the city
eventually regranted the license, the plaintiff alleged injury based on low attendance at
the concert)" A jury found the City of Newport liable and awarded the plaintiff $72,910
in compensatory damages and $275,000 in punitive damages." 9
 The city appealed,
claiming that punitive damages were not available against a municipality under section
1983. 1 " The Supreme Court agreed with petitioner and, in a six-to-three decision, found
the City of Newport immune from any finding of punitive damages.'"
In Fact Concerts the Court once again adopted a two-part approach to analyzing
section 1983. 121
 The Court began its analysis by looking to a municipality's liability for
punitive damages under the common law. "3 The Court noted that in 1871, municipal
corporations were immune from suits for punitive damages.'" Due to this generally
accepted state of 1871 common law, the Court reasoned that the members of the
Forty-Second Congress, by failing to provide otherwise, intended to extend municipal
immunity from punitive damages into section 1983. 1 " The Court then moved directly to a
consideration of the policy behind both section 1983 and punitive damages.'"
In discussing the public policy of both section 1983 and punitive damages, the Court
concluded that the goals of punitive damages, both punishment and deterrence, were not
met when punitive damages were awarded against a municipality.'" Consequently the
Court concluded that the common law immunity from punitive damages for munici-
palities should also apply to section 1983 actions. 128 In reaching this conclusion, the Court
reasoned, in part, that deterrence was more effectively served through assessing punitive
damages against the offending official, and thus his personal finances, rather than against
the municipality.'" Despite this reasoning, however, the Court did not explicitly hold that
punitive damages were available against a state official in a suit filed under section 1983. 1 "
1'7 Id. at 251-52. The respondents had obtained a license from the city. Under the contract, the
city retained the right to withdraw the license in the interest of public safety. Id. at 250. The city
exercised that right when one week before the concert, the respondents replaced a scheduled jan
band with the rock group Blood, Sweat and Tears. Id. While the respondents successfully obtained a
restraining order the morning of the concert, thus allowing the group to perform, attendance at the
event was low. Id. at 252.
"" Id. at 252.
"9 Id. at 253.
120 Id.
121 Id. at 271. Justice Brennan filed a dissenting opinion stating that the petitioners had failed to
file a ti mei), objection, as required under Rule 51 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Restricting
his argument to this procedural deficiency, he failed to reach the substantive issue of punitive
damages. Id. at 271-79 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
122 Id. at 258 - 59. For a discussion of other cases in which the Court adopted a two-part approach,
see supra notes 52-80, 97-114 and accompanying text.
1 " 453 U.S. at 259-63.
12' Id, at 259-60.
122
 Id. at 263.
'26
	 at 266-71.
127 Id. at 269-70. The Court also expressed concern that a jury, given complete discretion in
awarding punitive damages, might be prejudiced against a municipality, with its unlimited taxing
power. Id. at 270-71.
128 Id. at 271.
l" Id. at 269.
I SO In Smith v. Wade, the Court cited Fact Concerts for its reliance on awarding punitive damages
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B. Supreme Court References to Punitive Damages under Section 1983 Against a State Official
The Fact Concerts Court's reference to the possibility of punitive damages against a
state officiaP3 ' did not constitute the Court's only discussion of that issue before Smith v.
Wade.'" In fact, several earlier opinions contained indications that punitive damages
might be available under section 1983, and included suggestions as to the standard under
which they should be awarded. 133 For example, in a concurring opinion in S.H. Adickes v.
Kress & Co. , 134 Justice Brennan stated that punitive damages were available under section
1983. 135  Adickes, the plaintiff alleged a violation of her equal protection rights.'" She
claimed that a restaurant refused to serve her because she was in the company of blacks
and that the refusal of service and her arrest were pursuant to a conspiracy between the
restaurant and the police. 13? The issue before the Court in Adickes was procedural;
whether the moving party had proved the absence of any disputed material fact.'"
Determining that the moving party had not carried this burden, the Court reversed the
lower court's order granting summary judgment.'" The section 1983 case was reversed
and remanded.'" In his concurring opinion, Justice Brennan took the opportunity to
discuss the issue of damages.'" He noted the potential for punitive damages to encourage
effectively proprietors of public places to respect constitutional rights.'" Justice Brennan
suggested that punitive damages could be awarded where the plaintiff had shown that the
defendant acted "with actual knowledge that he was violating a right" or with reckless
disregard of whether he was thus violating such a right."'"
The Court also referred to the issue of punitive damages in Carey v. Pip/rms.' As was
discussed previously the Carey Court held that the compensatory theories of tort law
applied to suits filed under section 1983 for violations of procedural due process.'"
Justice Powell, writing for the majority in Carey, suggested that Congress may have
intended compensatory damages to constitute the sole deterrent to constitutional viola-
tions.'" In a footnote, however, the opinion indicated that punitive damages !night be
against an offending criminal. 461 U.S. 30, 36 n.5 (1983). Using this reliance by the Fact Concerts
Court, the Wade Court argued that the standard for punitive damages, not their availability, was the
only issue to be resolved. Id. at 35-36.
131 453 U.S. 247, 269 (1981). See supra notes 127-30 and accompanying text.
131 461 U.S. 30 (1983).
123 Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 22 (1980); id. at 47-48 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Carey v.
Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 257 n. II (1978); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 233.34 (1970)
(Brennan, J., concurring).
1" 398 U.S. 144 (1970).
' 35 Id. at 233-34 (Brennan, J., concurring).
136
 Id. at 146.
'IT Id. at 147-48.
138
 Id. at 153.
119 Id.
"5 Id. at 174.
"' Id. at 231-34 (Brennan, J., concurring).
142 Id. at 234 (Brennan, J., concurring).
143 Id. at 233 (Brennan, J., concurring). Compare the standards proposed by Justice Brennan
here and those established by the Court through Justice Brennan's majority opinion in Wade, 461
U.S. 30 (1983), infra notes 173-217 and accompanying text. While the lower standard ("reckless
indifference") remained the same, the higher standard articulated in Wade changed from "actual
knowledge" in Adickes to "evil motive or intent" in Wade. 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983).
'" 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
'" Id. at 264. See supra notes 97-114 and accompanying text.
t" Id. at 256-57.
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awarded "in a proper case under [section] 1983.' 7 Through this footnote, the Court
expressly reserved judgment on the validity of several lower court decisions awarding
punitive damages in actions under section 1983. 14" The Court concluded, however, that
Carey did not constitute "a proper case" because the defendants, when they suspended the
students without a hearing, had not acted "with a malicious intention to deprive [them] of
their rights or to do them other injury."' 49 Although the majority in Carey did not
specifically articulate a standard for punitive damages under section 1983, it did note that
the defendants had not acted with malicious intent.'" By measuring the conduct of the
defendants only against an intent standard, however, the Court impliedly rejected Justice
Brennan's suggested standard articulated in Adickes' 51 of reckless disregard.
Finally, in Carlson v. Green, 152 the Court, through Justice Brennan, and a dissenting
opinion by Justice Rehnquist, debated the appropriateness of punitive damages in section
1983 actions. In Carlson, the plaintiff brought suit on behalf of the estate of her son
claiming that federal prison officials, by violating her son's due process, equal protection
and eighth amendment rights, were responsible for his personal injuries, from which he'
died.'" Although Carlson, because it was an action against federal officials, did not involve
section 1983 directly, its holding is nonetheless relevant to section 1983 analysis.'" The
Court held that a plaintiff could bring a suit against federal officers without proceeding
under the Federal Tort. Claims Act. 155 Writing for the majority in Carlson, Justice Brennan
stated that punitive damages "are especially appropriate to redress the violation by a
Government official of a citizen's constitutional rights."'" The Court then cited justice
Powell's footnote in Carey v. Piphus for the proposition that "punitive damages are
available in a 'proper' [section] 1983 action." 157 Justice Rehnquist, in a dissenting opinion,
'" Id. at 257 n.11.
'"
149 id.
1" Id, Justice Powell would later join justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinion in Wade, and thus
adopt "actual malice" or "wrongful intent" as a standard fir punitive damages. 461 U.S. at 56, 84. See
infra notes 218-57 and accompanying text. The fact that Justice Powell later adopted a wrongful
intent standard strengthens the argument that he was advocating that very standard in Carey.
398 U.S. 144, 233 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring). See supra notes 140-43 and accompany-
ing text.
152
 446 U.S. 14 (1980).
1" Id. at 16.
446 U.S. at 23. This type of suit has now become known as a "Bivens action." A Blum action,
established in Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), is a judicially created equivalent
of a section 1983 action, applying, however, to those acting under color of federal law. Finding little
reason to distinguish between state and federal officers, the Riven., Court found an implied remedy
for the violation of fourth amendment rights. Id. at 397. In Carlson, the Court did the same for an
eighth amendment violation. 446 U.S. at 17 - 19. Due to the virtual equivalence of proceeding under
section 1983 or a Bivens action, the discussion of punitive damages in Carlson is appropriate for
section 1983 analysis.
15' 446 U.S. at 23. The Federal Tort Claims Act gives an individual a cause of action against the
federal government. The suit may be based on negligence, or in some cases, intentional torts. 28
U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2680(h) (1982). For a discussion of the Carlson Court's consideration of the
Federal Tort Claims Act, see Comment, Carlson v. Green: The Inference of a Constitutional Cause of
Action Despite the Availability of a Federal Tort Claims Act Remedy, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 561 (1981).
'8
 446 U.S. at 22.
147 Id. (quoting Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 257 n.11 (1978)). See supra notes 144-51 and
accompanying text.
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emphasized that the Court had yet to determine the availability of punitive damages in a
section 1983 action, "despite the Court's assertion to the contrary."'" The dissent faulted
the Court for misreading Carey by neglecting to consider that Carey expressly reserved
judgment on lower court cases that had awarded damages in suits brought under section
1983.'"
Before Smith v. Wade, therefore, although the issue of punitive damages had never
been directly decided by the Court, a majority of the Justices appeared to have assumed
that punitive damages were available against a defendant in a section 1983 suit.'" Lower
federal court decisions reflected this assumption. Those lower courts, often citing Carey
and Carlson, were virtually unanimous in awarding punitive damages under section
1983. 1 " A more difficult issue, and one resulting in significant disagreement among
members of the Supreme Court and among the lower federal courts was the application
of a precise standard by which punitive damages could be awarded.'" As noted previ-
ously, Justice Brennan had suggested that the standard should be one of "actual knowl-
edge" or "reckless disregard," 163 while Justice Powell had implied that the standard should
be malicious intent.'" The split in the lower courts reflected the disagreement between
Justices Brennan and Powell over the issue of intent.'" Moreover, by using many differ-
ent terms to describe the standard for awarding punitive damages, the lower courts
tended to add confusion to the issue beyond the original intent-recklessness dispute. The
terms "actual malice," 66 "malicious intent,"' "ill will,'" "reckless disregard,"'" "aggra-
vated circumstances," 170 "egregious conduct,' and "willful and malicious" 172 have all
been used by the lower courts in describing the standard for an award of punitive
damages. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Smith v. Wade to determine the proper
legal standard for instructing a jury whether it may grant punitive damages under section
1983.
" Id. at 47 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
" Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
1" Even in Smith v. Wade, the Court presumed that punitive damages were available under
section 1983. 461 U.S. at 35-36. See infra notes 179-80 and accompanying text.
See Bradley v. Coughlin, 671 F.2d 686, 690 (2d Cir. 1982); Zarcone v. Perry, 572 F.2d 52,
54-55 (2d Cir. 1978); Stengel v. Belcher, 522 F.2d 438, 444 & n.4 (6th Cir. 1975); Mansell v.
Saunders, 372 F.2d 573, 576 (5th Cir. 1967); Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74, 87-88 (3d Cir. 1965). But
see Huntley v. Community School Bd. of Brooklyn, 579 F.2d 738, 741 (2d Cir. 1978) (following Carey
v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 257 n.11 (1978), in reserving judgment on punitive damages while holding
that under the facts of this particular case the plaintiffs had not proved "malicious intention").
161 See supra notes 131-59 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 131-43 and accompanying text.
1 " See supra notes 144-51 and accompanying text.
"Th Compare Morrow v. Igleburger, 584 F.2d 767, 769 (6th Cir. 1978) (malicious intent) with
Cochetti v. Desmond, 572 F.2d 102, 106 (3d Cir. 1978) (actual knowledge or reckless disregard).
Smith v. Losee, 485 F.2d 334, 344 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 908 (1974).
"7 Morrow v. Igleburger, 584 F.2d 767, 769 (6th Cir. 1978).
'" Silver v. Cormier, 529 F.2d 161, 163 (10th Cir. 1976).
Cochetti v. Desmond, 572 F.2d 102, 106 (3d Cir. 1978).
'7° Konczak v. Tyrrell, 603 F.2d 13, 18 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1016 (1980).
'7 ' Fielder v. Bosshard, 590 F.2d 105, I I 1 (5th Cir. 1979).
12 Hanna v. Drobnick, 514 F.2d 393, 398 (6th Cir. 1975).
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II. THE SMITH V. WADE DECISION
A. The Majority Opinion
In a five-to-four decision, in Smith v. Wade, 173 the Supreme Court affirmed the Court
of Appeals' assessment of punitive damages against a state official in a section 1983 suit.'"
The Court held that punitive damages were available under section 1983 where the
defendant's conduct depicted either an "evil motive or intent" or displayed a "reckless or
callous indifference" in the violation of the plaintiff's constitutionally protected rights.'"
Written by Justice Brennan,'" the majority opinion began by noting that, for guidance, it
would look to the common law of torts in 1871, as well as modern common law.'" The
Court stated that it would then determine whether the purpose and policy behind section
1983 dictated a change from the common law rule.' 78 The Court noted that the petitioner,
the guard on duty at the prison, had conceded that punitive damages were available in a
"proper" section 1983 action.'" While the majority recognized that the Court had never
specifically confronted the issue of the availability of punitive damages, it stated that prior
decisions had revealed the Court's approval of section 1983 punitive damages.'"
Addressing the defendant's first contention, that the proper standard for punitive
damages in all cases under section 1983 was actual intent, the Court began by analyzing
1871 common law."' The Court noted the uncertainty in 1871 regarding the precise
standard to be applied in awarding punitive damages.'" According to the Court, this
uncertainty centered on the degree of negligence or culpable indifference required to
justify punitive damages, and not whether actual intent was an essential element for
recovery.'" In fact, the Court continued, the rule in the majority of jurisdictions spec-
ifically recognized that punitive damages could be obtained without a showing of actual
intent to injure.'" In support of this reading, the Court cited to and quoted from several
late nineteenth century Supreme Court opinions which held that the standard for recov-
ering punitive damages was proof of negligence, recklessness, or other culpable conduct
short of "actual ill will, spite, or intent to injure."'" The Court found further support for
'" 461 U.S. at 31.
"4
 Id. at 56.
175 Id.
17" Justices White, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens joined Justice Brennan's opinion. 461 U.S.
at 31. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Rehnquist and Powell dissented in an opinion written by
Justice Rehnquist. Id. at 56. Justice O'Connor dissented separately. Id. at 92.
"I Id. at 34.
'" Id.
179 Id. at 35-36.
18° Id. at 36. See .supra notes 131-59 and accompanying text. The Wade Court cited City of
Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 269-70 (1981), as a decision premised on the availability
of punitive damages. See supra notes 127-30 and accompanying text,
181 Id. at 38-45.
182 Id. at. 39.
"3 Id. at 40-41.
'R4
	 at 41.
' 4' Id. at 41-44. The Court cited Philadelphia, W. & B.R. Co. v. Quigley, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 202,
214 (1858) (malice implies a "spirit of mischief" or "criminal indifference to civil obligations");
Milwaukee & St. Paul R. Co. v. Arms, 91 U.S. 489, 495 (1875) (for punitive damages, there must be
"that entire want of care which would raise the presumption of a conscious indifference to conse-
quences"); Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Humes, 115 U.S. 512, 521 (1885) (dicta suggesting the availabil-
ity of punitive damages for gross negligence). 461 U.S. at 41-44.
Much of the argument as to the correct standard occurred in footnotes, where, in an effort to
September 1984]	 CASENOTES	 1015
a reckless indifference standard in a number of 19th century lower federal court and state
court cases, citing many decisions which had adopted various standards of negligence and
recklessness for an award of punitive damages.'"
The Court then stated that modern tort law also supported the conclusion that proof
of actual evil intent was not necessary to recover punitive damages.'" Refuting assertions
by the dissent that recent common law was irrelevant to the issue of a standard under
section 1983, the Court stated that, in considering modern law, it was merely following
precedent exemplified in the section 1983 immunity cases.'" For example, the Court
noted that in Imbler v. Pachtman, 189 it had recognized a common law immunity which had
not come into existence until twenty-five years after section 1983's enactment.'" Accord-
ing to the Court, Congress "did not intend to freeze into permanent law whatever
principles were current in 1871, rather than to incorporate applicable general legal
principles as they evolve." 191 The Court stated that it was firmly established under current
tort law that the standard for punitive damages was "evil motive or . reckless indifference
to the rights of others." 192
Having determined the intent of the Forty-Second Congress through 1871 common
law, and having gained further support for a recklessness standard through the current
standard for punitive damages in modern tort law, the Court considered whether the
policies and purposes of section 1983 required a departure from the rules of tort common
law)" The Court began by stating that, as a general matter, it could find no reason why a
person whose rights under a federal statute have been violated should have a more
limited remedy than an individual asserting an ordinary cause of action under tort law)"
Although the Court agreed with the defendant's contention that the purpose of punitive
damages was deterrence rather than compensation for the injured party, it rejected the
defendant's argument that a recklessness standard was too vague to deter effectively.m
Referring to a decision in the context of the first amendment where it had adopted a
standard of recklessness for the award of punitive damages,'" the Court noted that the
need for certainty in the first amendment area, and the desire not to inhibit the freedom
offered by it, was at least as pressing as the concerns expressed by the defendant in
Wade.'" Because the very same standard of recklessness served as the threshold for
punitive damages in tort law, the Court questioned the necessity for applying a different
make understandable the cases it had cited, the Court defined terms such as "malice," "willful," and
"wanton," Id. at 39-47 nn.8- 12. The Court concluded that malice, as used in the last century, did not
denote intent or ill will. Rather, it was a "hopelessly versatile and ambiguous term." Id. at 39 n.8.
"Wanton" and "willful," according to the Court, were never taken to denote intent or ill will. /d. at 40
n.8. "Wanton" referred to reckless behavior and "willful" referred to the freedom and spontaneity by
which a person acted. 4/.
1" Id. at 45-47 n.12.
'" Id. at 46-48.
'm Id. at 34 & n.2. Ste supra notes 52-86 and accompanying text.
1 " 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
19° 461 U.S. at 35 n.2.
' 91 Id. at 34 n.2.
L" Id. at 46-47 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(2) (1977)) (emphasis supplied
by the Court).
' 93 Id. at 48.
194 Id. at 48-49.
ld. at 49.
' 9" Id. at 50 (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974)).
197 461 U.S. at 50.
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approach under section 1983. 1" Moreover, the Court stated that the defendant's conten-
tion that the recklessness standard was too vague to be administered fairly failed to
recognize the distinction between a standard for punitive damages and the threshold
standard for liability in the first instance.l® According to the Court, state officials are
concerned with the underlying standards for permissible conduct when carrying out their
duties, rather than the standard for punitive damages.'" The Court explained that, in
effect, the need for a perfectly clear standard for punitive damages only arises if the fear
of having to pay compensatory damages will not deter state officials."' The presence of
officials who seek to guide their conduct by the standard for punitive damages, the Court
continued, establishes a strong argument against, rather than for, raising the threshold
for punitive damages.'" In concluding its rejection of the defendant's argument for a
stricter, or actual intent, standard, the Court suggested that the defendant would more
appropriately attack the vagueness of a recklessness standard on the issue of liability itself,
rather than on the issue of punitive damages.203
After rejecting the defendant's argument that an intent standard should apply in all
punitive damages cases under section 1983, the Court turned to the defendant's second
argument; that such a standard should apply in the matter before it.'" At trial, the district
court's instruction specified the same threshold of liability for both punitive and compen-
satory damages.' The defendant claimed that his qualified immunity as a prison guard,
and the resulting higher threshold for initial liability, also necessitated the higher stan-
dard of malicious intent for punitive damages2® He argued that a stricter standard was
necessary if punitive damages were to satisfactorily fulfill their deterrence function."'
Distinguishing between the threshold for, and the availability of, punitive damages, the
majority rejected this argument.2 0" The Court noted that even though the standards of
liability for compensatory and punitive damages were identical, a significant distinction
between the two types of awards existed2® Once liability is established, the Court ex-
plained, conduct satisfying the standard automatically resulted in an award of compen-
satory damages. 21° In contrast, the Court stated that the question whether to award
punitive damages still remained subject to the discretion of the jury.'" Furthermore, the
Court noted that the common law has never had a rule requiring that the standard for

















212 Id. at 53. The Court offered examples of several torts for which a jury could find liability and
award punitive damages based on the same standard of conduct. Id. at 53-59. According to the
Court, these torts included malicious prosecution, intentional infliction of emotional distress, defa-




Finally, the Court concluded, as it had with the defendant's first argument, that the
defendant had given "no good reason to depart from the common-law rule in the context
of section 1983,' The Court rejected the defendant's argument that too low a threshold
for punitive damages would undermine the policy which extends qualified immunity to
prison guards.'" According to the Court, the immunity covers an officer's discretion in
the ordinary operations of a correctional institution.' The Court recognized that this
discretion does not extend to conduct that amounts to reckless indifference to the rights
and safety of prisoners.' Consequently, the Court affirmed the district court's instruc-
tion to the jury that punitive damages may be assessed where the defendant's conduct is
reckless!'
B. The Dissenting Opinions
Justice Rehnquist wrote a dissenting opinion in Wade and was joined by Chief justice
Burger and Justice Powell.'" The dissent began by considering the purposes of punitive
damages.219 The dissent reasoned that three possible rationales for granting punitive
damages existed: first, to punish the defendant; second, to deter individuals from violat-
ing the rights of others; and third, to provide a "bounty" which encourages private
litigation seeking to assert legal rights!' Despite these alleged justifications, the dissent
continued, the doctrine of punitive damages has been severely criticized and conse-
quently, should be applied in limited situations. 22 ' The dissent noted that jurors awarded
punitive damages in unpredictable amounts, and that frequently the award resulted in a
windfall for a plaintiff, since he had already been compensated."'"
In this dissenting opinion Justice Rehnquist referred to the Court's consideration of
modern tort law as "a novel approach"' to section 1983. According to the dissent, the
Court's role in interpreting section 1983 is to determine what the Forty-Second Congress
intended in enacting the provision!" Stating that the state court decisions from the 1970's
used by the majority in its opinion were of no relevance to the issue before the Court, the
dissent reasoned that it was "unprepared to attribute to the [Forty-Second] Congress the
truly extraordinary foresight the Court seems to think it had."'" Many section 1983
decisions interpreted common law decisions, the dissent continued, because many mem-
bers of the Forty-Second Congress, as lawyers, were familiar with legal principles and
rules of that time!" Courts thus relied on the common law during that period to
determine congressional intent.' The dissent then reasoned that recent state court
decisions, relied on by the Court, were irrelevant for showing what the Forty-Second





 Id. at 56.
21 Id. at 56 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Id. at 57 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
229 Id. at 58 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
221 Id .
222 Id. at 59 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
222 Id. at 66 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
2" Id. at 65 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
225 Id. at 65-66 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
226 Id. at 66 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
227 Id.
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Congress intended for a punitive damages standard.'" Dismissing the Court's reliance on
the immunity cases for its consideration of modern law, the dissent stated that the
immunity cases only demonstrated an attempt to determine congressional intent., al-
though in some cases indirectly.'
In addition to disagreeing with the Court's use of modern tort law, the dissent
authored by justice Rehnquist also disputed the majority's interpretation of 1871 com-
mon law.'" According to the dissent, the earlier decisions "unambiguously" supported an
actual malice standard for awarding punitive damages."' Although the dissent cited
many of the saute cases as the Court had and quoted several of the same passages,'" the
dissent's conclusions differed from the Court's in the interpretation of key terms used in
the cases.' Just as the Court had, the dissent employed extensive footnotes to define the
terms "malice," - willful," and "wanton."":" Unlike the Court, however, the Rehnquist
dissent used those terms to show that 1871 common law provided an intent standard for
an award of punitive damages.' Additionally, according to the dissent, at the time
Congress enacted section 1983, many of the thirty-seven states then in the Union required
some showing of wrongful intent before punitive damages could he awarded.'
Having concluded that the common law in 1871 required a higher standard than
mere recklessness, the dissent stated that a number of other factors indicated that the
Forty-Second Congress intended a "wrongful intent" standard!' Looking to the lan-
guage of section 1983, the dissent concluded that the absence of any express provision
allowing punitive damages impliedly disallowed them. 23" The dissent emphasized that the
provision allows plaintiff's who are deprived of any rights, privileges or immunities
secured by federal law to seek redress.'" The dissent argued that the phrase "for redress"
was the only reference to damages in the statute and consequently, indicated Congress'
intent to limit the section 1983 remedy to compensatory damages.'" In addition, the
dissent pointed to express references to punitive damages in other statutes which were
roughly contemporaneous with section 1983 as signifying that if Congress had intended
section 1983 to require punitive damages, it would have specifically provided for them in
229 Id.
229 Id. at 66-67 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
-3" Id. at 68 (Rehnquist, J.. dissenting).
731 Id.
232 Id. at 68-75 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citing Philadelphia, W. & B.R. Co. v. Quigley, 62 U.S.
(21 How.) 202, 214 (1858); Milwaukee v. St. Paul R. Co. v. Arms, 91 U.S. 489, 493 (1875); Western
Union Tel. Co, v. Eyser, 91 U.S. 495, 496 (1875) (mem.); Lake Shore & Mich. Southern Ry. Co. v.
Prentice, 147 U.S. 101, 107 (1893); Scott v. Donald, 165 U.S. 58, 86 (1897)),Iti. See supra note 185 and
accompanying text.
233
	 at 60 n.3 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
' Id. Malice, according to the dissent, required an examination of the defendant's mental state
as to whether he foresaw, or willed, an evil result. Id. at 60 -61 n.3. Contrary to the finding of the
Court, the dissent interpreted the terms willful and wanton to have several meanings. Id. at 62 n.3.
The dissent noted the connotations of evil motive and intent given to the terms in criminal law and
concluded that given the punitive, and consequently criminal flavor of punitive damages, these terms
evinced a minimum requirement of intent to harm. Id. at 62-63 n.3. Compare the definitions given by
the majority, .supra note 185.
232 461 U.S. at 75 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
239 Id. at 77- 78 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting),
ear Id. at 84 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Id. at 85 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). For the exact language of section 1983, see supra note 2.
461 U.S. at 85 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
240 Id.
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the statute."' The dissent, therefore, found little congressional intent in favor of punitive
damages.' Given the ambiguity, the dissent argued that it was incorrect for the Court to
adopt the most expansive standard for an award of punitive damages. 242
In addition to finding that congressional intent dictated an intent standard, the
dissent discussed five separate policy considerations which it argued also supported a
stricter standard.' First, the dissent emphasized that punitive damages were not a
"Favorite in the law."" The dissent, therefore, stressed the importance of limiting, as
opposed to expanding, such an unpopular doctrine,' Second, the dissent found an
especially compelling need for a strict punitive damages' standard where the volatile
environment of prisons forces officials to take swift and decisive action.' The dissent
explained that one of the main reasons for granting qualified immunity is that the threat
of liability must not impede that official's willingness to carry out his duties in a way which
will benefit the public good.' For the very same reason that the Court had previously
granted qualified immunity to prison officials, the dissent urged an additional protection
for those same officials against punitive damages."' According to the dissent, the majority
decision subjects government officials to the possibility of damage awards which bear no
relation to any harm they actually caused and in spite of their having acted in good
faith.' Third, the dissent distinguished between remedies under section 1983 and
remedies under state tort law.' The dissent stated that one of the most often used
justifications for punitive damages is that they, in effect, are a response to the legal
system's failure to provide financing for a plaintiff's litigation expenses.' This rationale
does not apply to section 1983, the dissent contended, because the statute expressly
provides for attorney's fees."' Fourth, the dissent envisioned the availability of punitive
damages as initiating a further barrage of section 1983 claims in an already overcrowded
federal court system.'" Finally, the dissent distinguished between a state punishment
against a state official and a federal punishment against a state official.' The dissent
noted that while states could choose the standards by which they punish their own
officials, it was not necessary for the federal government. to abide by those standards.'' In
addition, the dissent reasoned that by granting incentives for plaintiffs to bring their
claims in federal courts, the Court was infringing on sensitive areas between the state and
federal governments.'
241 Id. at 85-86 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
242 Id. at 86 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting),
243
 Id.
294 Id. at 87-92 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
245 Id. at 87 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Id. at 88 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
247 Id. at 88-89 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
"I' Id. at 88 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
249 Id.
2" Id.
"1 Id. at 89- 90 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
252 Id. at 90 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
253
	
42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982) states in relevant part: "In any action or proceeding to enforce a
provision of sections 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986 of this title	 . the court, in its discretion, may
allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's lee as part of the
costs." Id.
244 461 U.S. at 91 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
us /d. at 92 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
2" Id.
227 Id.
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Justice O'Connor filed a separate dissenting opinion. 258 Although agreeing with the
result reached in Justice Rehnquist's dissent, Justice O'Connor voiced her disapproval of
both the Court's and Justice Rehnquist's reliance on the common law of 1871. 2" Justice
O'Connor asserted that such a methodology was "ultimately unilluminating" in a situation
where no generally prevailing view of common law in 1871 could be determined.'"
AccOrding to Justice O'Connor, once it was established that the common law provided no
guidance on the question of congressional intent, the inquiry should turn to the policies
underlying section 1983 to determine which rule most satisfies those policies."' Justice
O'Connor stated that the principal purpose of section 1983 is to compensate victims of
constitutional violations and to deter future violations.'" Compensatory damages, in her
view, completely served that goal.'" Finding deterrence to be the essential goal of
punitive damages, Justice O'Connor concluded that a recklessness standard would "chill
public officials in the performance of their duties" more than it would deter violations of
the Constitution.' fi4 Justice O'Connor agreed with Justice Rehnquist's fears that a reck-
lessness standard would result in an enormous number of section 1983 suits, a prolifer-
ation that would prohibit the courts from devoting the necessary time to valid causes of
action,'" Consequently, the opinion determined that compensatory damages under sec-
tion 1983, and attorney's fees under section 1988, offered an adequate deterrence."'
In arriving at a standard for punitive damages under section 1983, the majority and
the two dissents in Wade all focused first on the common law of torts and then on the
Nolicies behind section 1983. The majority concluded that under common law the stan-
narcl for punitive damages, both in 1871, the year of section 1983's enactment, and under
modern tort law, was recklessness."' After examining the purposes and policies behind
section 1983, the majority could find no reason to depart from the common law rule, and
thus the Court. adopted a recklessness standard for section 1983 punitive damages 2 6$
Justice Rehnquist, in his dissent, disagreed with the majority's interpretation of 1871
common law, finding that it expressed an actual malice or intent standard.'" Additionally,
he viewed the majority's survey of modern tort law as irrelevant since, according to his
dissent, the purpose of analyzing the common law was limited to determining what the
Forty-Second Congress intended in enacting section 1983. 276 After looking to the com-
mon law, the dissent turned, as had the majority, to the policies and purposes behind
section 1983. Unlike the majority, however, the Rehnquist dissent argued that these
considerations necessitated a stricter intent standard for awarding punitive damages.'"
Justice O'Connor, dissenting separately, disapproved of both the majority's and Justice
Rehnquist's reliance on 1871 common law, arguing that no generally prevailing view
28' Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
"59 Id.
260 Id, at 92-93 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
261 Id. at 93 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
262 Id.
263 Id.
Id. at 93-94 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
265 Id.
268 Id. at 94 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
zer See supra notes 181 -92 and accompanying text.
"8 See supra notes 193-217 and accompanying text.
269
	
supra notes 230-36 and accompanying text.
22" See supra notes 223 -29 and accompanying text.
"' See supra notes 237-57 and accompanying text.
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existed at that time.'" Focusing solely on policy considerations, Justice O'Connor agreed
with the Rehnquist dissent that courts would best carry out the purposes of section 1983
by establishing an intent standard for awarding punitive damages."'
111. THE I MPACT Or SMITH V. WADE
The Supreme Court's two-step approach to punitive damages in Smith v. Wade is
consistent with its approach to earlier section 1983 cases."' In its decision, the Court
relied on both the common law of torts and the purpose and policy behind section
1983. 275 Additionally, the Court's decision to adopt a reckless indifference standard for
punitive damages under section 1983 is consistent with the Court's holdings in previous
cases where the Court ultimately transferred the common law tort rule to section 1983. 276
This section of the casenote will examine the significance of both the Court's holding and
its reliance on the two-step approach. First, the section will analyze the potential ramifica-
tions of the Wade decision."' The analysis will discuss Wade's impact on both plaintiff's and
defendants in future section 1983 suits. It will be submitted that the added protection
offered plaintiffs through the application of a lower standard for punitive damages
outweighs the added burdens placed on defendants. Second, this section will address the
Court's reliance on the two-step approach and, more particularly, the Court's considera-
tion of modern tort law. 278 The discussion will conclude that the Court's consideration of
modern tort law was proper. It will be suggested, however, that the Court's use of modern
tort law could have a significant effect on the two-step approach in future Supreme Court
decisions.
A. The Impact of Wade on Section 1983 Litigation
In Wade, the Supreme Court held that a jury could assess punitive damages in a
section 1983 suit where the defendant's conduct evidences either an evil motive or intent,
or a reckless indifference, to the plaintiff's federally protected rights.'" The effect of this
holding in section 1983 suits is significant for both plaintiffs and defendants. For plain-
tiffs, section 1983 becomes a more effective device for remedying constitutional violations
due to the Court's application of a relatively lenient standard for awarding punitive
damages. The plaintiff's burden of proof under a reckless indifference standard is, of
course, not nearly as demanding as it would have been under an actual intent standard.
Moreover, the Court's adoption of a lower standard for punitive damages is impor-
tant when considered in conjunction with the Court's earlier' holding in Carey v. Piplins. 28"
In Carey, the Court held that plaintiffs deprived of their right to procedural due process
could recover damages only in compensation for their actual injuries:'"' With this ruling,
the Court rejected the plaintiffs' two arguments. First, the Court disagreed with the
272 See supra notes 258-61 and accompanying text.
"3 See supra notes 262 - 66 and accompanying text.
"4 For cases taking a similar approach, see supra notes 52-86 & 97-130 and accompanying text.
275 461 U.S. at 34.
"" See, e.g., City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271 (1981); Carey v. Piphus.
435 U.S. 247, 257 (1978); Pierson v, Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554-55 (1967).
"7 See infra notes 279-301 and accompanying text:
272 See infra notes 302 -35 and accompanying text.
2" 461 U.S. at 56.
2 K0 435 U.S. 247 (1978). See supra notes 97-114.
2
" 1 Id. at 254.
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assertion that courts should presume, without proof by plaintiffs, that some injury results
from procedural clue process violations. Second, the Court rejected the plaintiffs' conten-
tion that courts should award substantial damages given the violation of constitutional
rights, whether or not the violation causes actual injury.'" Instead, the Court ruled that
tort theories of compensation apply to section 1983. The Carey Court noted the plaintiffs'
failure to show actual injury and limited their recovery to nominal damages. 283
While the Court restricted the application of its holding in Carey to violations of
procedural clue process,' some lower courts applied the Carey rule to other constitutional
violations as well, and thus limited recovery in those cases to compensable injuries.'" The
combination of the Supreme Court's decision in Carey and the lower courts' expansion of
Carey added support to the view that all section 1983 actions should be interpreted under
tort principles of compensation. According to this theory, plaintiffs bringing actions
under section 1983 could recover only for their actual injuries. The possibility that some
constitutional violations would remain completely unpunished, however, spurred com-
mentators to suggest the existence of fundamental differences between the compensation
goals of tort law and the deterrent goals of section 1983. For example, one commentator
suggested that due to the importance of constitutional interests, deterrence served a more
critical role in section 1983 cases than it did in tort law. 28" He thus found that being
"sensitive to the possible differences in function of tort law and 1983 liability" was
important . 2 "
Many commentators, therefore, urged that courts abandon theories of compensation
when considering section 1983 claims. They argued that section 1983 should give rise to
liquidated damages. 26" Under this approach, section 1983 plaintiffs would be entitled to
damages merely upon proof that the defendant violated their rights, whether or not they
suffered an injury. Liquidated damages, according to this approach, would effectively
deter local officials from violating an individual's rights. Absent liquidated damages,
however, commentators emphasized that courts could use punitive damages as effective
deterrence. These commentators stressed the critical importance of establishing a stan-
dard for punitive damages low enough to provide that deterrence."'
In Smith v. Wade, the Supreme Court's decision to allow punitive damages for reckless
conduct comports with the suggestions of the commentators. In cases such as Carey,2"
where a constitutional violation does not result in a compensable injury, punitive damages
might constitute the only damage remedy available to the plaintiff. By allowing that
plaintiff to collect punitive damages upon proof that the defendant acted recklessly,
282 Id.
Id. at 256-57, 267.
2" Id. at 264-65.
2" for a list of cases expanding the Carey holding, see supra note 100.
288 Nahmod, supra note 8, at 10-11.
Id. at II. See also Note, Section 1983: An Analysis of Damage Awards, 58 NEB. L. Rev. 580,
580-81 (1979) (distinguishes between the private right protected in tort law and the public right
protected under section 1983); Comment, Civil Actions for Damages under the Federal Civil Rights
Statutes, 45 "11x. L. REV. 1015, 1026 (1967) (author argues that tort law damages do not provide the
positive, punitive remedy necessary for punishment and deterrence).
2" See Newman, supra note 7, at 465; Note, Damage Awards for Constitutional Torts: A Reconsidera-
tion After Carey v. Piphus, 93 HARV. L. REV. 9641, 989 (1979); Note, Measuring Damages for Violations of
Constitutional Rights, 8 VAL. U. L. REV. 357, 363-65 (1974).
2" See McClellan and Northcross, supra note 7, at 466-67; Note, Punitive Damages Under Federal
Statutes: A Functional Analysis, 60 CALIF. L. REV. 191, 219 (1972).
435 U.S. 247 (1978).
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rather than requiring the more difficult burden of proving intent, the Court in Smith v.
Wade has recognized both the importance of constitutional rights, irrespective of actual
injury, and the need to provide deterrence against officials violating those rights.
Conversely, for section 1983 defendants, many of whom enjoy a qualified immunity,
the Wade decision means that the existence of a qualified immunity has no effect on the
standard by which punitive damages are awarded."' Qualified immunity protects a
defendant from liability when he performs his duties in good faith,'" and, therefore,
raises the standard of liability for compensatory damages from negligence to the higher
standard of gross negligence or recklessness."' The Wade Court rejected the defendant's
argument that the existence of qualified immunity should likewise raise the standard of
liability for punitive damages from recklessness to intent.'" As a result of the Court's
holding, the standards for liability and punitive damages are identical for a defendant
with qualified immunity. After Wade, a jury is justified in assessing punitive damages
against that defendant any time it finds the defendant liable for compensatory dam-
ages."' Jury awards for a defendant's reckless conduct, therefore, could become sig-
nificantly more burdensome on section 1983 defendants.
Based on the policy behind section 1983, the result reached by the Court was proper.
Congress enacted section 1983 to offer citizens increased protection from encroachment
by state officials."' The statute, along with the Supreme Court's decision in Monroe v.
Pape ,297 accomplished this goal by giving citizens who have been deprived of their con-
stitutional rights by state officials the option to file suit in a federal foru m .298 By allowing a
plaintiff to collect punitive damages where a state official's conduct constitutes reckless or
intentional behavior, z"9 the Wade Court has attempted to deter such conduct. The Court
has reasoned convincingly that a reckless standard for punitive damages will further the
policies behind section 1983. In Wade, the Court centered its analysis on the belief that a
person bringing a cause of action for the violation of his federally protected rights should
not have a more restrictive remedy than one bringing an ordinary tort action. 3" The
dissent, in suggesting a stricter intent standard, failed to refute that contention. Justice
Rehnquist, in his dissent, insisted that punitive damages are not "a favorite in the law." 301
Beyond that broad pronouncement, however, the dissent did not explain why a reckless
state official is more deserving of protection than a reckless tortfeasor. Indeed, given the
291 461 U.S. at 55.
See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
2" 461 U.S. at 51. See supra note 57.
29' Id. at 51-55.
/d. at 52. The defendant in Wade pointed to the identical standards and argued that to serve
the punitive and deterrent purposes of punitive damages adequately, the standard for punitive
damages would have to be higher. Id. The Court, in rejecting this argument, distinguished between a
threshold for, and an award of, punitive damages. Id. See also supra notes 204-12 and accompanying
text. The Court stated that given behavior by the defendant that satisfies the recklessness standard,
the jury still retains discretion whether or not to award punitive damages. Id. at 51-52. Despite the
Court's distinction, however, the recklessness standard is used for awards of both compensatory and
punitive damages.
2s6 For a discussion of the legislative history behind section 1983, see Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S.
165, 172-83 (1961).
297 365 U.S. 165 (1961). See supra notes 5-6. 88-96 and accompanying text.
299 See id. at 183.
2'3 461 U.S. at 56.
acr° Id. at 48 -49.
301 Id. at 58 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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high value that this society places on constitutional rights, the majority's contention
appears almost impossible to refute. From this perspective, the Wade decision appears to
he well-founded.
B. The Impact on the Court's Two-Step Approach
While Wade's expansion of punitive damages under section 1983 will greatly affect
both plaintiffs and defendants, Wade's impact on the Court's general approach to section
1983 will be equally, if not more, significant to future litigation. Wade represents another
instance, in a growing line of section 1983 cases, where the Court has employed a two-step
analysis in its approach.'312 The Wade Court relied first on the common law of torts and
second on the purpose and policy behind section 1983 in adopting a standard for punitive
damages under section 1983.'3
 In employing the two-step analysis, however, the Wade
Court confronted two issues which it had not considered in earlier cases using this
approach. First, the Court was faced with an area of the common law that was unsettled,
particularly in 1871. 3 ' Second, and perhaps relatedly, the Court extended its analysis
beyond 1871 into the modern common law of torts."' Although the Court had relied on
post. 1871 common law in earlier section 1983 Unmunity decisions," its use of modern
law had never been an issue in the case. In effect, Wade was the first case in which the
Court has confronted the legitimacy of its consideration of modern law in determining
the scope and applicability of section 1983. Additionally, Wade was the first case in which
the Court relied on modern common law where it had many cases to consult under 1871
common law. To measure Wade's impact on the Court's two-step approach to section
1983, an examination of the Court's reliance on both an unsettled area of 1871 common
law and modern common law is necessary.
Both Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, anti Justice Rehnquist., in the dissent,
devoted a considerable amount of attention to 1871 common law in an effort to deter-
mine the accepted standard for punitive damages in 1871, and correspondingly, the
congressional intent behind section 1983. 307
 While the Court's reliance on 1871 common
law is consistent with its analysis in earlier section 1983 cases, these earlier cases differ
from Wade in that their analyses of 1871 common law produced clear and generally
accepted principles. In Carey v. Piphus, for example, the Court considered whether
plaintiffs alleging violations of procedural clue process needed to show actual injury to
recover damages.'" The Court looked to the common law in 1871 and determined that
the compensatory theory of damages "could hardly have been foreign" to the Forty-
Second Congress.' Similarly, in City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc.' and Tenney v.
For a description of cases employing the two-step analysis, see sup ra notes 60-80, 96-130 and
accompanying text.
"3 461 U.S. at 34.
'"I Compare the Court's analysis of 1871 common law, 461 U.S. at 38 -45, with Justice Re-
linquisi's analysis of 1871 common law. Id. at 68-84 (Rehnquist, J., diss enting).
305 461 U.S. at 46-49 & n.13.
306 See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
3°7 For a description of the opinions by Justice Brennan and Justice Rehnquist, see supra notes
173-257 and accompanying text. The majority and dissent agreed on the importance of interpreting
19th century common law. Interestingly, neither brief submitted to the Court developed the 1871
common law and congressional intent argument. See generally Brief for Petitioner, Smith v. Wade,
461 U.S. 30 (1983); Brief for Respondent, id.
3" 435 U.S. 247 (1978). See supra notes 97-114 and accompanying text.
"9 Id. at 255.
"" 453 U.S. 247 (1981). See supra notes 115-30 and accompanying text.
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Brandhove,'" both immunity cases, the Court experienced little difficulty in determining
that the immunities in question existed under the common law in 1871. 3 ' 2
No generally accepted standard existed, however, for an award of punitive damages
under 1871 common law."' An examination of the differences between the issue of
immunities and the issue of standards for punitive damages reveals the reason for the
dispute over the law in 1871. In sharp contrast to the limited number of immunities
available to a particular defendant,'" many descriptions of culpable conduct are used."'
Furthermore, while definitions of the immunities are relatively straightforward, interpre-
tations of the descriptions of culpable conduct are confusing.' Absolute immunity
carries only one definition."' "Malice," "willful," "wanton," "reckless," and "gross negli-
gence," on the other hand, are vague terms, defined in equally vague language."'
Additionally, while their meanings today are difficult to grasp, their accepted meanings
over 100 years ago are that much more elusive."' The Court acknowledged and at-
tempted to avoid the difficulty over definitions of culpable conduct by specifically choos-
ing not to use "malice" in its enunciated standard for punitive damages, due to the
"confusion and ambiguity" surrounding the term.'"
Due to this confusion, the Court's reliance on 1871 common law was not as convinc-
ing in Wade as it had been in earlier section 1983 cases. The citing of the same cases by
both the Court and Justice Rehnquist demonstrated that no single standard for punitive
damages existed in 1871.321 These cases, as Justice O'Connor's separate dissent aptly
observed, were "ultimately unilluminating." 3" Had the Court oonsidered only 1871
311 341 U.S. 367 (1951). See supra notes 60-68 and accompanying text,
312 City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, luc., 453 U.S. 247, 260 (1981); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341
U.S. 367, 372-76 (1951). In early section 1983 immunity cases, some members of the Court argued
that the language "every person" in the statute expressly abolished immunities. Pierson v. Ray, 386
U.S. 547, 559 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting). Now, however, this argument has been rejected and
the Court merely considers the immunity granted under the common law. The Court seldom
disagrees on this particular issue. But see Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 346 (1983) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) ("[Albsolute immunity for witnesses was by no means a settled legal proposition in
1871.").
313 Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 93 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
3 " See supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text.
3" See D. Dobbs, supra note 27, at. 205; Ellis, supra note 27, at 20.
"6 See D. Dobbs, supra note 27, at 206.
"T See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
"g See supra notes 174, 234.
3'9 Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 93 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
32° Id. at 37 n.6.
321 An example of the opposite conclusions reached by the Court and Justice Rehnquist is found
in their interpretations of Milwaukee St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Arms, 91 U.S. 489, 493 (1875) (court
cannot award punitive damages unless conduct "was the result of that reckless indifference to the
rights of others which is equivalent to an intentional violation of them.... The tort is aggravated by
the evil motive... ."). Justice Brennan read this excerpt as stating that "recklessness is 'equivalent' to
intent, meaning that the two are equally culpable and deserving of punishment and deterrence." Id.
at 43 n.10. Justice Rehnquist, on the other hand, emphasized that the rule of punitive damages
"'rests' on a defendant's 'evil motive'." Id. at 71 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). He also argued that his
interpretation was the only possible interpretation, given the holding of the case. Id. The Arms Court
held that "gross negligence" was not sufficient conduct to warrant punitive damages. 91 U.S. at 495.
Justice Rehnquist noted the lack of distinction between "gross negligence" and "recklessness," and
suggested that the Court would not have rejected one standard and adopted the other. 461 U.S. at 72
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
322 461 U.S. at 92 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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common law, rather than both 1871 and modern common law, in determining that the
common law standard was reckless indifference, and then conducted its examination of
policy considerations, serious questions may have arisen concerning the effectiveness of
the Wade Court's use of the two-step approach. According to precedent, considerations of
policy in a section 1983 case are undertaken solely to determine whether such policy
dictates a change from the common law" In a situation where the common law provides
a definitive answer, analysis of public policy serves only a secondary function to the more
critical determination of the common law status. If that common law status is undefined,
however, or at least unconvincing, the two-step analysis becomes merely a one-step
analysis, namely, a consideration of public policy."'
The Court, however, did not limit its analysis of the common law to the confusing
pre-1871 case law. The Court strengthened its argument concerning the common law
standard by claiming that the modern common law of torts also established a recklessness
standard for an award of punitive damages." The Court was correct in considering
modern tort law. First, some of the immunity cases, which the Court cited, had relied on
modern tort law in applying immunities under section 1983." For example, in Imbler v.
Pachtman,327 the Court granted an immunity to prosecutors even though the common law
did not recognize an equivalent immunity until 1896, twenty-five years after the enact-
ment of section 1983. 3" Second, and perhaps more importantly, the Court's suggestion
that Congress did not intend to "freeze into permanent law whatever principles were
current in 1871"3" is highly persuasive. In interpreting congressional intent, the Court
has labeled section 1983 "a species of tort liability." 33° A guiding principle behind tort law
is its adaptability to meet the needs of a changing society." It would seem inconsistent to
structure section 1983 around tort principles, but to analyze cases only in light of tort
principles in 1871.
Despite the affirmative use of the modern common law of torts, the Wade Court
attempted to minimize its reliance on modern law by claiming that the standard for
punitive damages had not changed between 1871 and the present.' The Court, there-
fore, implied that the use of modern law was not critical to its holding." The Court's use
of modern law was important, however, for two reasons. First, in the Wade case, it
represented an additional argument to support the Court's claim that the 1871 standard
for punitive damages was reckless indifference. As a result, the Court was less dependent
on an outright acceptance of its analysis of 1871 common law. The Court was able to
discuss the state of the law in 1871 with the knowledge that even if its analysis merely
323 Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 424 (1976).
324 This one-step analysis is the approach Justice O'Connor advocated in Smith v. Wade, 461
U.S. 30, 92 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). She suggested that due to the unsettled nature of
punitive damages in 1871, the Court should examine only policy considerations. Id. at 93. By
choosing not to consider the modern tort law when analyzing section 1983 actions, Justice O'Connor
impliedly acknowledged her belief that the Court should not look to modern tort law, even when the
common law in 1871 is unclear.
461 U.S. at 46-49 & n.13.
32' See cases discussed supra note 86.
9" 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
"' Id. at 421.
32s
	 U.S. at 34 n.2.
3.1° Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 253 (1978); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 417 (1976).
lit See W. PROSSER, LAW or Tours, § 4, at 19-20 (4th ed. 1971).
3" 461 U.S at 34-35 n.2.
333 See id.
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demonstrated the unsettled state of the law, its conclusion, in light of the current common
law standard, remained strong. Second, from a broader perspective, other litigants may
now rely on Wade in arguing that the modern law of torts is relevant to the two-step
analytical approach under section 1983. 3' According to the Wade Court, this reliance on
modern law was not important because the law had not changed.' The Wade Court's
reliance on modern common law could become important, however, in a section 1983
case where the common law of torts has changed significantly between 1871 and the
present. While in Wade, the Court's use of modern law merely buttressed its argument
about earlier common law, in a future case, a court's consideration of modern law could
yield two different tort rules, one from 1871 common law and the other from present law.
Conflicts between the old and the present would raise new issues. A court would then
have to determine whether to interpret section 1983 according to principles prevalent in
1871 common law, and thus in line with congressional intent, or whether to allow section
1983 to change with the common law, and thus adjust to the changing times. While Wade
does not answer this question definitively, it proceeds further than other section 1983
cases in establishing the relevancy of modern law to a section 1983 analysis.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in Smith v. Wade not only confirmed the existence of
punitive damages in a section 1983 action, but it also established the standard by which
they are awarded. The Court's holding renders section 1983 a more effective tool for
plaintiff's by allowing a jury to assess punitive damages against a defendant for mere
reckless conduct. By adopting the more lenient standard of recklessness, the Court
increases the likelihood that state officials will be subject to substantial judgments, even, in
some cases, where their constitutional violations do not cause otherwise compensable
injuries. The Court approached Wade by using the traditional two-step analysis it applies
to section 1983 cases. It examined the standard for punitive damages under the common
law and considered whether that standard satisfied the policy behind section 1983. In so
doing, the Court properly expanded the first step in this analysis by relying not only on
the common law as of 1871, but also on the modern law of torts.
EDWARD F. MAHONEY
3" Earlier courts could have cited the immunity cases for support in using modern tort law, as
the Wade Court did. Wade, however, now represents much stronger precedent for the proposition
that modern common law is relevant to the section 1983 analysis. First, the Court in Wade specifically
confronted this issue and approved the use of modern tort law in analyzing section 1983 actions. 461
U.S. at 46-48,34-35 n.2. Second, the Wade Court relied on modern common law despite the existence
of pre-1871 common law which analyzed standards for punitive damages. Id. at 38-45. In earlier
cases, the Court had only relied on modern law when the particular issue had not been discussed
prior to 1871. See supra. note 86.
The extent to which Separation of Powers concerns would restrain the Court from fashioning
new common law in the absence of at least implicit Congressional authorization is not within the
scope of this article.
461 U.S. at 34 n.2.
